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Abstract
Recently, the discussion regarding the consequences of cutting the corpus callosum (“split-brain”) has regained momentum
(Corballis, Corballis, Berlucchi, & Marzi, Brain, 141(6), e46, 2018; Pinto et al., Brain, 140(5), 1231–1237, 2017a; Pinto,
Lamme, & de Haan, Brain, 140(11), e68, 2017; Volz & Gazzaniga, Brain, 140(7), 2051–2060, 2017; Volz, Hillyard, Miller,
& Gazzaniga, Brain, 141(3), e15, 2018). This collective review paper aims to summarize the empirical common ground, to
delineate the different interpretations, and to identify the remaining questions. In short, callosotomy leads to a broad breakdown
of functional integration ranging from perception to attention. However, the breakdown is not absolute as several processes, such
as action control, seem to remain unified. Disagreement exists about the responsible mechanisms for this remaining unity. The
main issue concerns the first-person perspective of a split-brain patient. Does a split-brain harbor a split consciousness or is
consciousness unified? The current consensus is that the body of evidence is insufficient to answer this question, and different
suggestions are made with respect to how future studies might address this paucity. In addition, it is suggested that the answers
might not be a simple yes or no but that intermediate conceptualizations need to be considered.
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Introduction
The term “split-brain” refers to patients in whom the corpus
callosum has been cut for the alleviation of medically intrac-
table epilepsy. Since the earliest reports by van Wagenen and
Herren (1940) and Akelaitis (1941, 1943) on the repercus-
sions of a split-brain, two narratives have emerged. First and
foremost is the functional description, pioneered by
Gazzaniga, Sperry and colleagues (Gazzaniga, Bogen, &
Sperry, 1963; Gazzaniga, Bogen, & Sperry, 1962; Sperry,
1968), in which the intricacies, the exceptions, the effects of
different testing conditions, and the experimental confounds
have been delineated by decades of extensive research with a
relatively small group of patients (Berlucchi, Aglioti, Marzi,
& Tassinari, 1995; Corballis, 1994; Corballis et al., 2010;
Corballis, 2003; Luck, Hillyard, Mangun, & Gazzaniga,
1989; Pinto, Lamme, & de Haan, 2017b; Volz, Hillyard,
Miller, & Gazzaniga, 2018). It is important to note that even
in this small group there are differences. In some patients all
commissures were severed (“commissurotomy”), in others
only the corpus callosum was cut (“callosotomy”) and some
patients fall somewhere in between these two boundaries.
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Now, the search term “split-brain” results in a total of 2848
publications in the database of the Web-of-Science and
29,300 hits on Google Scholar, indicating a wealth of detailed
information. The other depiction of split-brain patients entails
the first-person perspective of the split-brain. In other words,
“what is it like” to be a split-brain patient? It is especially this
perspective that has captured the attention of the general press,
popular science books and basic textbooks. By its nature, this
second narrative lacks the detail of the functional description
of the phenomenon, but it captures the intriguing question of
how unity of consciousness is related to brain processes.
Dominant in this description is the idea that in a split-brain
each hemisphere houses an independent conscious agent. This
notion, and particularly the concept of an isolated but con-
scious right hemisphere that is unable to express its feelings,
desires or thinking due a lack of language, has captured the
imagination (Gazzaniga, 2014).
It is important to clarify what wemean by unified conscious-
ness. Here, we use the term in the sense of “subject unity” as
defined by Bayne (Bayne & Chalmers, 2003; Bayne, 2008;
Bayne, 2010). Subject unity is present if all the experiences
generated in a system belong to one subject. In other words, if
a system contains a first person perspective, then subject unity
is preserved if that system only contains one such perspective,
but subject unity is absent if the system contains multiple first
person perspectives. Thus, in our definition of conscious unity,
consciousness in a split-brain is split if each cortical hemisphere
houses an independent conscious agent.
The view that consciousness is split in a split-brain has
significantly impacted cognitive neuroscience at large. For
instance, currently dominant theories about conscious aware-
ness - the Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2005;
Tononi, 2004) and the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, Kerszberg, &
Changeux, 1998) - may be critically dependent on the validity
of this view. Both theories imply that without massive com-
munication between different subsystems, for instance cortical
hemispheres, independent conscious agents arise. Thus, if the
split consciousness view is invalid, these theories may be crit-
ically challenged.
The idea of split consciousness in a split-brain had its
origin in the early split-brain studies (Gazzaniga, 1967;
Gazzaniga, 1975; Gazzaniga et al., 1962; Sperry, 1968).
These studies tested patients primarily in the two percep-
tual domains where processing is largely restricted to the
contralateral hemisphere, that is vision and touch. In these
early studies, stimuli, for instance objects, that were pre-
sented to the left hemisphere either physically in the right
hand or as an image in the right visual half-field, could be
readily named (as the left hemisphere is dominant for
language) or pointed out with the right hand (which is
controlled by the left hemisphere). The patient’s behavior
became intriguing when the stimuli were presented in the
left visual field or in the left hand. Now the patient, or at
least the verbal left hemisphere, appeared oblivious to the
fact that there had been a stimulus at all but was never-
theless able to select the correct object from an array of
alternatives presented to the left hand or the left visual
half-field (see Fig. 1). In a particularly dramatic recorded
demonstration, the famous patient “Joe” was able to draw
a cowboy hat with his left hand in response to the word
“Texas” presented in his left visual half field. His com-
mentary (produced by the verbal left hemisphere) showed
a complete absence of insight into why his left hand had
drawn this cowboy hat. Another astonishing example in-
volved the same patient. MacKay and MacKay (1982)
flashed a digit in the left visual field and trained the pa-
tient to play a version of ‘20 questions’ across hemi-
spheres. The left hemisphere guessed the answer vocally,
and the right hemisphere provided responses by pointing
‘up’ (meaning ‘guess a higher number’) or ‘down’ with
the left hand. In this way the patient managed to vocalize
the right answer. This suggests two independent con-
scious agents communicating with each other (one
steering the left hand, the other agent controlling vocal
expressions). However, note that an alternative interpreta-
tion is possible. Perhaps the patient knows the answer but
finds it hard to vocalize. The ‘20 questions’ then simply
help him in finding the correct vocalization.
Thus, these early observations suggested that there is no
meaningful communication between the two hemispheres in
split-brain patients. This led to the hypothesis that there might
be two separate conscious agents, a left hemisphere that is able
to talk to us and can explain what it sees and feels, and a mute
right hemisphere that cannot communicate in language but
that can nevertheless show that it has perceived and recog-
nized objects and words. However, over time this view has
eroded somewhat due to several anomalies (even right from
the start) that may challenge this view.
Fig. 1 One of the most well-known split-brain findings is that the patient
claims verbally not to have seen the stimulus in the left visual field, yet
indicates the identity of it with their left hand. This suggests that the left
hemisphere (controlling verbal output) is blind to the left visual field,
while the right hemisphere (controlling the left hand) does perceive it
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Common Ground
An early observation, suggesting some remaining unification
concerned what Joe Bogen called the “social ordinariness” of
split-brain patients. Apart from a number of anecdotal inci-
dents in the subacute phase following the surgery, these pa-
tients seem to behave in a socially ordinary manner and they
report feeling unchanged after the operation (Bogen, Fisher, &
Vogel, 1965; Pinto et al., 2017a; R. W. Sperry, 1968; R.
Sperry, 1984), although their extra-experiment behavior has
not been systematically observed in great detail (Schechter,
2018). While the right hemisphere appears to be better at
recognizing familiarity from faces, self-face recognition, that
is the ability to realise immediately that a presented photo-
graph represents you, appears to be available equally to both
hemispheres in a split-brain patient (Uddin et al., 2008; Uddin,
2011). Thus, it seems unlikely that a mute but conscious right
hemisphere would not have made itself known one way or the
other. Thus, right from the start a paradox arose. The con-
trolled lab tests suggested that consciousness is split in split-
brain patients. Yet, everyday experiences of the patient and
their close ones suggests that only one person exists in a split-
brain. Additionally, it has been suggested that the two separate
consciousnesses-hypothesis presumes that in the intact brain
(before surgery) both hemispheres were conscious but con-
nected via the corpus callosum, and they only became disso-
ciable due to the operation. This casts doubt on the viability of
the two consciousness view.
Crucially, the lab tests themselves were not always sup-
portive of the split-consciousness view. Multiple experi-
mental results showed that capacity for communication be-
tween the hemispheres varies both across patients and
across tasks. For instance, a central observation in split-
brain patients concerns the inability to compare visual stim-
uli across the midline. In other words, when one stimulus is
presented to the left visual hemifield and the other to the
right hemifield, the patient cannot accurately indicate
whether both stimuli are the same or not, although they
can do so when both stimuli are presented within one visual
field. This is consistent with the notion that each hemisphere
independently perceives the contralateral visual field, and
that an intact corpus callosum is necessary for integration.
Although there are indeed many examples of split-brain
patients who are incapable of comparing stimuli across the
midline, prominent examples can also be found of patients
who can compare stimuli across the midline (Johnson,
1984; but see Seymour, Reuter-Lorenz, & Gazzaniga,
1994). This points to an important problem in the field,
namely, individual differences. One aspect that may be im-
portant for individual differences is handedness differences.
Variations in handedness may lead to differences in lan-
guage capabilities in the right hemisphere, and could even
underly differences in inter-hemispheric integration.
Moreover, under certain circumstances nearly all tested
split-brain patients seem able to compare, or integrate, partic-
ular types of stimuli across the two visual half-fields (see Fig.
2). An early demonstration of across hemifields integration is
the study by Eviatar and Zaidel (1994). They showed that
split-brain patients could accurately indicate the identity and
shape of upper- and lower-case letters in either hemifield,
regardless of with which hand they responded, for instance
accurately identifying the letter A in the left visual field with
the right hand. Yet these patients were mostly unable to com-
pare these same stimuli across visual fields. In another exper-
iment, two tilted lines were presented with a gap between
them. The lines were positioned in such a way that extending
them across the gap would either cause the lines to coincide or
to run in parallel. When split-brain patients indicate whether
the lines are parallel or coincident, they are highly accurate,
even when both line segments are located in different half-
fields (Corballis, 1995; Pinto, de Haan, Lamme, & Fabri, n.d.;
Sergent, 1987; Trevarthen & Sperry, 1973). Another example
of visual integration across the midline involves apparent mo-
tion. When two dots are presented in succession at a short
distance (2 to 14 visual degrees), split-brain patients are able
to accurately indicate whether the dots create apparent motion,
or that they were presented simultaneously or with delays too
long to provoke apparent motion. Critically, they are able to
do so even when one dot appears in the left visual field, and
the other in the right visual field (Knapen et al., 2012; Naikar
& Corballis, 1996; Ramachandran, Cronin-Golomb, &
Myers, 1986). Clearly, under specific conditions, there is
meaningful communication between the two hemispheres in
the absence of the corpus callosum.
Another observation that suggests some form of unity
across the two visual half fields concerns detection and local-
ization of stimulation, for instance, a brief flash (see, for ex-
ample, an early study on the response times to light flashes
with the ipsi- or contralateral hand: Clarke & Zaidel, 1989).
Several investigations (Corballis, Corballis, Fabri, Paggi, &
Manzoni, 2005; Pinto et al., 2017a; Trevarthen & Sperry,
1973) have demonstrated convincingly that split-brain pa-
tients can accurately report the presence and location of stim-
uli for any position in the whole visual field, with either hand,
and even verbally. Accurate detection and localization appears
to be possible for all patients and all stimuli (different shapes,
figures, equiluminant stimuli) tested so far. Thus, when pa-
tients in earlier studies said that they saw “nothing” when a
stimulus was presented in the left visual half-field, they may
have meant that they could see it but that they could not iden-
tify or retrieve the name of the object.
Other findings point to a crucial difference between the
degree of lateralization of visual-perceptual processing and
producing overt responses. Perception appears to be more
split, while responding remains largely unified. Whether a
stimulus appears in the left or the right visual hemifield
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strongly impacts performance of split-brain patients.
However, response type (left hand, right hand or verbally)
seems to have a much smaller, or no effect at all. For instance,
Pinto et al., 2017a) found that the split-brain patient was much
better at matching pictures to sample stimuli in the left visual
field. Yet, for the exact same stimuli matching pictures to
verbal labels was vastly superior when the stimuli appeared
in the right visual field. Crucially, response type did not play
any role. The patient was better in matching pictures to sample
for stimuli in the left visual field, even if they responded ver-
bally or with the right hand. Similarly, Levy, Trevarthen, and
Sperry (1972) presented split-brain patients with chimeric or
composite faces, that is, one half-face in each visual field.
Subsequently the patient either matched the chimeric face to
sample, or attached a verbal label to it. Verbal matching was
mostly based on the half-face in the right visual field, while
matching to sample was mainly driven by the half-face in the
left visual field. But crucially, the latter was the case, indepen-
dent of whether the patient responded with the left or the right
hand.
Thus, it seems that in split-brain patients perceptual pro-
cessing is largely split, yet response selection and action con-
trol appear to be unified under certain conditions. This, by
itself, does not prove whether a split-brain houses one or
two conscious agents. One explanation could be that the
split-brain houses two agents, each having their own experi-
ences, who synchronize their behavioral output through vari-
ous means. Another possible explanation is that a split-brain
houses one agent who experiences an unintegrated stream of
information who controls the entire body, comparable to
watching a movie where sight and sound are out-of-sync. At
any rate, these findings challenge the previously mentioned
classic split-brain description, which is still found in reviews
and text books (Gray, 2002; Wolman, 2012). In this classic
characterization the patient indicates that they saw nothing
when a stimulus appeared in the left visual field. Yet, to their
own verbal surprise, the left hand correctly draws the stimulus.
The aforementioned examples of unity in action control sug-
gests that these effects may depend on the type and complex-
ity of the response that is required.
Interpretations
There are three, not-mutually exclusive, hypotheses
concerning the mechanisms involved in, seemingly, preserved
unity in the split-brain. The first notion is that information is
transferred subcortically. The second idea is that ipsilateral
motor control underlies unity in action control. The third idea
claims that information transfer is based on varies forms of
inter-hemispheric collaboration, including subtle behavioral
cues. The first proposal (Corballis Corballis, Berlucchi, &
Marzi, 2018; de Haan et al., 2019; Pinto, Lamme, & de
Haan, 2017b; Pinto et al., 2017a; Savazzi et al., 2007;
Mancuso, Uddin, Nani, Costa, & Cauda, 2019) suggests that
the multitude of subcortical connections that are spared during
surgery are responsible for the transfer of information. As was
initially pointed out by Trevarthen (1968) and Trevarthen and
Sperry (1973) and recently stressed by Pinto, de Haan, and
Lamme (2017a) and Corballis et al. (2018), there are many
commissures (white matter tracts that connect homologous
structures on both sides of the central nervous system) and
decussations (bundles that connect different structures on both
sides) that link nuclei that are known to be involved in per-
ceptual processing. The importance of these commisural con-
nections for transferring visual information in split-brain pa-
tients has been highlighted by Trevarthen and Sperry (1973).
Moreover, the role of these connections in a split-brain has
recently been demonstrated by bilateral fMRI activations in
the first somatosensory cortex, after unilateral stimulation of
trunk midline touch receptors (Fabri et al., 2006) and in the
second somatic sensory area after unilateral stimulation of
hand pain receptors (Fabri, Polonara, Quattrini, & Salvolini,
2002). Uddin and colleagues used low-frequency BOLD
fMRI resting state imaging to investigate functional connec-
tivity between the two hemispheres in a patient in whom all
major cerebral commissures had been cut (Uddin et al., 2008).
Compared to control subjects, the patient’s interhemispheric
correlation scores fell within the normal range for at least two
symmetrical regions. In addition, Nomi and colleagues sug-
gested that split-brain patients might rely particularly on dor-
sal and ventral pontine decussations of the cortico-cerebellar
Fig. 2 Although most split-brain
patients cannot compare visual
features such as shape and object
identity across the midline, other
features, such as good continua-
tion of lines, and apparent motion,
are integrated without a corpus
callosum
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interhemispheric pathways as evidenced by increased frac-
tional anisotropy (FA) on diffusion weighted imaging
(Nomi, Marshall, Zaidel, Biswal, Castellanos, Dick, Uddin
&Mooshagian, 2019). Interhemispheric exchange of informa-
tion also seems to occur in the domain of taste sensitivity,
activation of primary gustatory cortex in the fronto-parietal
operculum was reported in both hemispheres after unilateral
gustatory stimulation of the tongue receptors (Mascioli,
Berlucchi, Pierpaoli, Salvolini, Barbaresi, Fabri, & Polonara,
2015). Note that patients may differ with respect to how many
of these connections have been cut, and this might also explain
some of the individual variance among patients. Moreover, in
all patients subcortical structures remain intact. For instance, the
superior colliculus is known to integrate visual information
from both hemispheres and project information to both hemi-
spheres (Meredith & Stein, 1986; Comoli et al., 2003). Such
structures may support attentional networks, and may enable
the right hemisphere to attend to the entire visual field. In turn,
attentional unity could help in unifying cognitive and motor
control, which may subserve ipsilateral motor control.
The second point concerns the ipsilateral innervation of the
arms. Manual action is not strictly lateralized, and the proxi-
mal (but not the distal) parts of the arm are controlled bilater-
ally, although the ipsilateral contribution remains undeter-
mined. This could explain why split-brain patients may re-
spond equally well with both hands in certain experimental
conditions (Corballis, 1995; Gazzaniga, Bogen, & Sperry,
1967; Pinto, de Haan, & Lamme, 2017a). First, there is sub-
stantial evidence that bilateral cortical activations can be ob-
served during unilateral limb movements in healthy subjects.
In addition, ipsilesional motor problems in arm control have
been observed in patients with unilateral cortical injuries, and
finally there is evidence from electrocorticography with im-
planted electrodes for localization of epileptic foci showing
similar spatial and spectral encoding of contralateral and ipsi-
lateral limb kinematics (Bundy, Szrama, Pahwa, & Leuthardt,
2018). While these observations argue convincingly for a role
in action control by the ipsilateral hemisphere, they do not
prove that a hemisphere on it’s own can purposefully control
the movements of the ipsilateral hand. Thus, the role of ipsi-
lateral arm-hand control in explaining split-brain findings is
currently not settled.
The third hypothesis argues that in addition to whatever
direct neural communication may exist between the hemi-
spheres, they may inform one another via strategic cross-
cueing processes (Volz & Gazzaniga, 2017; Volz et al.,
2018). The split-brain patients underwent surgery many years
prior to testing, and the separated perceptual systems have had
ample time to learn how to compensate for the lack of com-
missural connections. For example, subtle cues may be given
by minimal movements of the eyes or facial muscles, which
might not even be visible to an external observer but are ca-
pable of encoding, for example, the location of a stimulus for
the hemisphere that did not “see” it. A cross-cueing mecha-
nism might also allow one hemisphere to convey to the other
which one of a limited set of known items had been shown
(Gazzaniga & Hillyard, 1971; Gazzaniga, 2013).
Finally, it is possible to entertain combinations of the dif-
ferent explanations. For instance, it is conceivable that in the
subacute phase following split-brain surgery the hemispheres
are ineffective in communicating with each other. During this
initial phase, phenomena such as an “alien hand” - that is a
hand moving outside conscious control of the (verbal) person
- may be present. In the ensuing period, the patients may have
learned to utilize the information that is exchanged via sub-
cortical connections, ipsilateral motor control or cross-cueing
to coordinate the processing of the two hemispheres. In such a
way, the patient may counteract some of the effects of losing
the corpus callosum.
What do We Need to Know?
This paper aims to contribute to the agenda for the next decade of
split-brain research. Full split-brain surgery is rare these days, and
it is important that we try to answer the central questions while
these patients are still available for study. In order to examine the
variations between patients it would be useful to test as many of
the available patients as possible with the same tests.
One important goal is to map out precisely how much func-
tionality and information is still integrated across hemispheres in
the split-brain, and what the underlying principles are. For in-
stance, in some cases the two hemispheres seem to carry out
sensory-motor tasks, such as visual search, independently from
one another (Arguin et al., 2000; Franz, Eliassen, Ivry, &
Gazzaniga, 1996; Hazeltine, Weinstein, & Ivry, 2008; Luck,
Hillyard, Mangun, & Gazzaniga, 1994; Luck et al., 1989), while
in other cases functions such as attentional blink, or attentional
cueing, seem to be integrated across hemispheres (Giesbrecht &
Kingstone, 2004; Holtzman, Volpe, & Gazzaniga, 1984;
Holtzman, Sidtis, Volpe, Wilson, & Gazzaniga, 1981; Pashler
et al., 1994; Ptito, Brisson, Dell’Acqua, Lassonde, & Jolicœur,
2009). An important challenge is to unveil why some cognitive
functions can be carried out independently in the separated hemi-
spheres while other functions engage both hemispheres.
Furthermore, it is now clear that accurate detection and localiza-
tion is possible across the whole visual field, and there is some
evidence that even more information concerning visual images
can be transferred between hemispheres. Although we have
some understanding of what types of information can be trans-
ferred in the visual domain, our knowledge base in the somato-
sensory domain is much more limited. This is probably due to a
bias throughout cognitive neuroscience and psychology, leading
to a strong focus on vision in split-brain research. It is important
to collect converging evidence by investigating the somatosen-
sory system which is also strongly lateralized. Note that in
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somatosensory processing transfer between hemispheres (about
80% correct for the bimanual conditions) has been ob-
served for basic same-different matching of real objects
(Fabri, Del Pesce et al., 2005).
Another important goal is to obtain a more detailed description
of the perceptual, cognitive and linguistic capabilities of the dis-
connected right hemisphere. For understanding unity ofmind, two
capabilities specifically are crucial. First, experiments investigating
aspects of the conscious mind often go beyond simple visual
processing, and future studies will thus critically depend on testing
high-level cognitive abilities of both hemispheres. Specifically,
language abilities, crucial for understanding questions and instruc-
tions, will likely play a pivotal role. Thus, the first question is to
what extent the right hemisphere is capable of language process-
ing. Note that complicated instructions (Gazzaniga, Smylie,
Baynes, Hirst, & McCleary, 1984; Pinto et al., 2017a; Zaidel,
1983), for instance relating to mental imagery (Johnson,
Corballis, & Gazzaniga, 2001; Kosslyn, Holtzman, Farah, &
Gazzaniga, 1985; Sergent & Corballis, 1990), seem to be well
within the reach of the right hemisphere. Moreover, right hemi-
sphere language capabilities seem to improve over time
(Gazzaniga, Volpe, Smylie, Wilson, & LeDoux, 1979;
Gazzaniga et al., 1996). Longitudinal language tests (for instance
with a Token test: De Renzi & Vignolo, 1962) would further
illuminate the extent of right hemisphere language processing.
Second, unveiling to what extent each hemisphere is capa-
ble of subserving consciousness at all seems relevant for unity
of mind as well. If the disconnected right hemisphere can
produce full-blown consciousness, then questions regarding
unity of mind are clearly more pertinent then if the right hemi-
sphere only produces minimal amounts of consciousness.
Right hemisphere consciousness can be studied through novel
neural paradigms (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Casali et al.,
2013; Pitts, Metzler, & Hillyard, 2014; Shafto & Pitts,
2015). For instance, Bekinschtein et al. employed EEG to
measure if the brain detected irregularities (as indicated by
an event-related potential [ERP] signal called the P3) in dif-
ferent states of consciousness. They found that when con-
sciousness was reduced, local irregularities were still detected
- for instance after three high auditory tones a low tone evoked
a P3. However, global irregularities - several times a low tone
followed three high tones, then on the critical trial three high
tones were followed by another high tone - did not evoke a P3
when consciousness was reduced. Crucially, when conscious-
ness was unimpaired both local and global irregularities
evoked a P3 response. Right hemisphere consciousness may
also be studied in other patient groups where interhemispheric
communication is hampered. One particularly interesting
group are post-hemispherotomy patients (Lew, 2014). These
patients have been surgically treated to disconnect an entire
hemisphere (usually for intractable epilepsy), but unlike hemi-
spherectomy patients the disconnected hemisphere remains in
place in the cranium and remains vascularized.
Clearly, the central question, whether each hemisphere sup-
ports an independent conscious agent, is not settled yet. Novel
paradigms in this respect could lead to progress. For instance, a
pivotal question is whether each hemisphere makes its own de-
cisions independent of the other hemisphere. If each hemisphere
produces its own autonomous conscious agent then this should
be the case. That is, if two agents are asked to freely choose a
random number, then the odds that they consistently pick the
same number are small. And vice versa, if each hemisphere
makes its own conscious decisions, independent of the other
hemisphere, then this seems to rule out unity of mind. Note that
each hemisphere making its own decisions is different from in-
formation processing occurring independently per hemisphere.
Unconscious information processing is almost certainly split
across hemispheres in a split-brain. However, this does not prove
that consciousness is split or unified. Even in a healthy brain,
where consciousness is unified, many unconscious processes run
independently, and in parallel.
One way to tackle the central question is by having the
hemispheres respond to questions in parallel. Overt behavior
most likely does not allow for this, due to bilateral motor
control processes sketched earlier. However, perhaps parallel
responding is possible if the hemispheres produce covert re-
sponses. For instance, the patient could be asked to pick one of
four options and indicate their choice by carrying out certain
content-specific mental imagery tasks. This imagery can then
be decoded in parallel from each hemisphere using neuroim-
aging techniques (see Owen et al., 2006 for a similar approach
with vegetative state patients). If each hemisphere harbors an
autonomous conscious agent, then it is highly unlikely that the
two hemispheres will consistently make the same choices.
Thus, if the choices are uncorrelated across hemispheres, then
this may critically challenge the unified mind view.
Another way to tackle the question of unified conscious-
ness in the split-brain is to employ ERPs as markers of con-
current conscious processing in the left and right hemispheres.
For instance, in one study (Kutas, Hillyard, Volpe, &
Gazzaniga, 1990) visual targets were presented either sepa-
rately to the left or right visual field or to both visual fields
simultaneously. It was found that the P300 - a signal possibly
reflecting conscious processing of a visual target (Dehaene &
Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014;
Salti, Bar-Haim, & Lamy, 2012) - was reduced for bilateral
targets. This suggests some type of integration of conscious
processing. Studies employing ERPs may indicate whether
conscious processing is unified, while unconscious processing
is split, which would be suggestive of unified consciousness.
Conclusions
In summary, the pivotal issue in split-brain research is whether
dividing the brain divides consciousness. That is, do we find
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evidence for the existence of one, or two conscious agents in a
split-brain? Note that intermediate results may be found.
Perhaps some measures indicate unified consciousness while
others do not. This would then provoke further interesting
questions on the unity of consciousness. What are the crucial
measures for unity of consciousness? If intermediate results
are found, more unconventional possibilities should be
entertained as well. For instance, although difficult to fathom,
some philosophers have suggested that a split-brain does not
contain one or two observers, but a non-whole number of
conscious agents (Nagel, 1971; Perry, 2009), for instance
one and a half first-person perspectives. If evidence for this
position is found, then its implications would stretch beyond
split-brain patients. It would suggest that our intuitions on the
indivisibility of the experiential self may be mistaken. One
way to think of this is as with the difference between con-
scious and unconscious processing. Perhaps this is not a di-
chotomous distinction, but a continuum between more or less
conscious. Similarly, perhaps the existence of a first-person
perspective is not dichotomous, but gradual as well. Another
possibility is that a split-brain does contain a whole number of
conscious agents, but that consciousness across these agents is
only partially unified. That is, the agents share some conscious
experiences and decisions, but not all (Lockwood, 1989;
Schechter, 2014; Schechter, 2018; Schechter, 2013). Finally,
another way to look at this is in terms of ‘dissociation’, as in
depersonalization (Phillips et al., 2001; Sierra et al., 2002).
Perhaps the number of agents is not altered, but the agent feels
depersonalized in some situations, and therefore no longer
feels that they control the actions, or even experience the in-
formation, that has just occurred in their brain.
New findings on the unity of consciousness in a split-brain
could fundamentally impact currently dominant conscious-
ness theories. Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene
& Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 1998) asserts that con-
sciousness arises when information that is processed in uncon-
scious (or preconscious) modules is broadcast to a central
‘workspace’, primarily residing in frontal regions of the brain.
Although not very explicit on the unity of consciousness in
split-brain patients, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory
seems to endorse the split consciousness idea, given that each
hemisphere has its own prefrontal hub, enabling broadcasting
of whatever information is processed in that hemisphere.
Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2005; Tononi,
2004) has specifically addressed the issue of split brain (for
instance in Tononi, 2004). Integrated Information Theory as-
serts that ‘phi’, a measure of how integrated information is,
determines the level of consciousness. The higher phi, the
more conscious a system is. Moreover, local maxima in phi
correspond to conscious agents. If in a system all subsystems
are highly interconnected, then phi is highest for the system as
a whole, and local maxima are absent. Thus, such a system
produces only one conscious agent. However, if subsystems
only exchange minimal amounts of information, then phi per
subsystem is higher than phi for the system as whole. In such a
case each subsystem creates its own conscious agent. In a
split-brain, connectedness, that is integration of information,
is much higher within than across hemispheres. Therefore,
according to Integrated Information Theory consciousness
should be split in a split-brain.
Recurrent Processing theory (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000;
Lamme, 2004; Lamme, 2010) argues for the independence of
consciousness from attention, access, or report. This theory
has addressed the issue of report specifically, making the case
that consciousness and reportability, whether verbal or manu-
al, should be viewed as entirely independent (Lamme, 2006;
Tsuchiya, Wilke, Frässle, & Lamme, 2015). Crucially, this
theory states that even in the normal mind, ‘islands’ of unat-
tended yet conscious information reside (Lamme, 2006). In
these cases, all the information, although functionally uninte-
grated, is nonetheless experienced by the same mind. Support
for this view comes from findings in multiple object tracking
(Pinto, Howe, Cohen, & Horowitz, 2010; Pinto, Scholte, &
Lamme, 2012; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). Here, evidence in-
dicates that when moving objects in two visual hemifields are
tracked, attention is split (Howe, Cohen, Pinto, & Horowitz,
2010) and each hemisphere processes the relevant information
in the contralateral visual field independently of the other
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005; Cavanagh & Alvarez, 2005;
Drew, Mance, Horowitz, Wolfe, & Vogel, 2014). That is,
the left hemisphere only tracks the right visual field and vice
versa. Yet, although the visual information is not integrated
across hemispheres, from a first person perspective, it seems
clear that the subject experiences all moving objects across the
entire visual field. Another example of the dissociation be-
tween consciousness and reportability is the so-called partial
report paradigm (Pinto et al., 2017b; Pinto, Sligte, Shapiro, &
Lamme, 2013; Sligte, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008; Sperling,
1960). In these paradigms subjects seem to remember more
than they can report. Thus, reportability and consciousness are
dissociated. Perhaps in split-brain patients this dissociation is
simply more pronounced. That is, consciousness remains uni-
fied, but reportability has become more dissociated, thereby
inducing the appearance of two independent agents. In sum,
according to the Recurrent Processing theory, integration of
information is not needed for a unified mind, implying that the
mind may remain unified when the brain is split. Thus, differ-
ent theories of consciousness have different predictions on the
unity of mind in split-brain patients, and await the results of
further investigation into this intriguing phenomenon.
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